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NOTES
"EVER BEEN IN A [FOREIGN] PRISON?":' THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSFER OF PENAL
SANCTIONS TREATIES BY U.S. STATES
David S. Finkelstein
INTRODUCTION
Transfer of penal sanctions treaties allow people who are arrested,
tried, and convicted of crimes abroad to serve their sentences in their
home countries.2 The United States is party to one multilateral agree-
ment3 and numerous bilateral treaties4 which govern the transfer of
penal sanctions. The purpose of these treaties and the federal legisla-
tion pertaining to them "is to facilitate the transfer of foreign prison-
ers to their home countries by establishing procedures that can be
initiated by prisoners who prefer to serve their sentences there."5
1. Airplane! (Paramount 1980).
2. See Abraham Abramovsky, Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaties: An Endan-
gered Species?, 24 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 449, 451-52 (1991) [hereinafter Abramovsky,
Endangered Species] (discussing the purpose of the transfer of penal sanctions treaty
with Mexico).
3. Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, done
Mar. 21, 1983, 35 U.S.T. 2867, 22 LL.M. 530 (entered into force July 1, 1985) [herein-
after Convention with Europe]. The United States has also signed a multilateral
agreement open to members of the Organization of American States. Inter-American
Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad, done June 9,1993, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 104-35 (1996), Hem's No. KAV 4762 (signed on behalf of the United States on
Jan. 10, 1995) [hereinafter Inter-American Convention]; Maureen T. Walsh & Bruce
Zagaris, The United States-Mexico Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sanctions: The
Case for Reevaluating the Treaty and Its Policies in View of the NAFTA and Other
Developments, 2 Sw. J. L. & Trade 385, 426 (1995). The Inter-American Convention
has not been ratified by the Senate and, thus, is not yet in force, but President Clinton
has urged the Senate to ratify it. Letter of Transmittal from William J. Clinton, Presi-
dent of the United States of America, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-35, at 11 (1996), Hein's
No. KAV 4762. Because the Inter-American Convention represents the most recent
example of a transfer treaty, this paper will refer to provisions of the Inter-American
Convention.
4. The United States has separate bilateral treaties with: Mexico, Canada, Bo-
livia, Panama, Turkey, Peru, France, and Thailand. Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3, at
390.
5. Letter of Submittal from William J. Clinton, President of the United States of
America, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-35, at V-VIII (1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762; see also
Convention with Europe, supra note 3, pmbL, 35 U.S.T. at 2870, 22 I.LM. at 530(stating that foreigners who are convicted of a "criminal offense should be given the
opportunity to serve their sentences within their own society"); H.R. Rep. No. 95-720
(1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.CA.N. 3146, 3146 ("The purpose of the act is to pro-
vide the implementation procedures for offender transfer treaties with Mexico and
Canada as well as for similar future treaties.").
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The transfer of penal sanctions treaties are substantially alike;6 each
treaty provides for a similar set of requirements and procedures for
transfer. First, the prisoner7 must be a national of the receiving state
in order to qualify for transfer.' Second, the act for which the pris-
oner was convicted must be a crime under both the transferring and
receiving states,9 although some treaties except prisoners convicted of
certain crimes from eligibility for transfer.'" Third, the treaties re-
quire that the prisoner consent to his transfer." The treaties differ
over whether the prisoner, receiving state, transferring state, or any of
these parties may initiate the transfer.'" Fourth, the treaties designate
the manner and location of prisoner transfers and how the costs of
transfer will be allocated.' 3 Fifth, the treaties provide that the sen-
tencing state retains the exclusive jurisdiction to review the prisoner's
conviction.' 4 These requirements are further supplemented by corre-
6. Abramovsky, Endangered Species, supra note 2, at 457.
7. Because the treaties and corresponding legislation use varied terminology, this
paper will use the terms "prisoner" and "offender" interchangeably.
8. Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, art. 111(4), S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-
35, at 2 (1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762; Convention with Europe, supra note 3, art.
3(1)(a), 35 U.S.T. at 2872, 22 I.L.M. at 531; Treaty on the Execution of Penal
Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, U.S.-Mexico, art. 11(2), 28 U.S.T. 7399, 7402 [hereinafter
United States-Mexico Treaty].
9. Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, art. 111(3), S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-
35, at 2 (1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762; Convention with Europe, supra note 3, art.
3(1)(e), 35 U.S.T. at 2872, 22 I.L.M. at 531; United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note
8, art. 11(1), 28 U.S.T. at 7402. The requirement that the offense committed be a
crime in both nations is referred to as "double criminality." See 18 U.S.C. § 4101(a)
(1994). If the transferring or receiving nation has a federal form of government,
double criminality can be satisfied if the act is an offense under the federal laws of the
nation or the laws of a state or province within that nation. Id. For a discussion of
double criminality and why it is an unnecessary restriction on the use of transfer trea-
ties, see William V. Dunlap, Dual Criminality in Penal Transfer Treaties, 29 Va. J. Int'l
L. 813 (1989).
10. See United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 8, art. 11(4), 28 U.S.T. at 7403
(requiring that the offense not be a "political offense" or an "offense under the immi-
gration or the purely military laws of a party"); see also Abramovsky, Endangered
Species, supra note 2, at 459-60 (citing examples of excluded offenses in the transfer
treaties between the United States and Mexico, Canada, Turkey, and Thailand).
11. Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, art. 111(2), S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-
35, at 2 (1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762; Convention with Europe, supra note 3, art.
3(1)(d), 35 U.S.T. at 2872, 22 I.L.M. at 531; United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note
8, art. IV(2), 28 U.S.T. at 7403.
12. Compare Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, art. V(1), S. reaty Doc.
No. 104-35, at 3 (1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762 (stating that any party may initiate the
transfer) with United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 8, art. IV(1), 28 U.S.T. at 7403
(stating that transfer should be commenced by the transferring state).
13. Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, art. V(8-9), S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-
35, at 3-4 (1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762; Convention with Europe, supra note 3, arts.
16-17, 35 U.S.T. at 2878-80, 22 I.L.M. at 535; United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note
8, art. V(1, 4), 28 U.S.T. at 7405-06.
14. Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, art. VIII, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-35,
at 4 (1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762; Convention with Europe, supra note 3, art. 13, 35
U.S.T. at 2878,22 I.L.M. at 534; United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 8, art. VI, 28
U.S.T. at 7406.
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sponding provisions in the U.S. federal enabling legislation,15 which
provides the statutory basis for participation in the transfer treaties.16
The transfer of penal sanctions treaties address two specific con-
cerns of the United States: (1) the physical abuse, corruption, and
sub-par living conditions encountered by many American citizens im-
prisoned abroad, 7 and (2) the financial difficulties regarding the im-
prisonment of foreign nationals in American prisons.' 8 The United
States also benefits from transfer treaties because the treaties seek to
improve international relations between nations and increase cooper-
ation in combating crime.19 Furthermore, transferring a prisoner to
his home country is likely to improve the prisoner's social rehabilita-
tion by enabling the prisoner to benefit from easier access to family,
friends, and counsel, as well as better and faster employment opportu-
nities upon release.2
15. Enabling legislation is usually passed in concurrence with or subsequent to
ratification of a treaty, and it empowers the government to act in accordance with the
treaty. See Khaldoun A. Baghdadi, Comment, Apples and Oranges-The Supremacy
Clause and the Determination of Self-Executing Treaties: A Response to Professor
Vazquez, 20 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 701, 710 (1997).
16. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3244, 4100-4115 (1994).
17. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-720 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146, 3146
(enumerating the complaints raised by the families of Americans imprisoned in Mex-
ico); Abramovsky, Endangered Species, supra note 2, at 454-55 (citing, for example,
the corruption, physical abuse, and generally poor conditions Americans imprisoned
in Mexico must endure); Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3, at 392-93 (stating that trans-
fer treaties are motivated by a desire to protect Americans from unsafe and unsani-
tary prison conditions). In 1996, approximately 2.200 Americans were arrested
abroad. Alfred Borcover, Departing Thoughts, Orange County Register, Dec. 29,
1996, at D7.
18. See Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3, at 393-94, 429-31 (citing the cost of incar-
cerating prison inmates as an incentive to decrease prison populations by transferring
prisoners out of the United States); see also Ken Chavez, IWlson Challenge of INS
Brings Inmate Full Circle, Sacramento Bee, Jan. 31, 1996, at Al (stating Governor
Pete Wilson's claim that California spends $400 million per year to house more than
20,000 undocumented immigrants in its prisons); Dave Lesher, Wilson Jab at U.S.
Takes 4-Hour Detour, L.A. Times, Jan. 31, 1996, at A3 (stating Governor Pete Wl-
son's claim that the Clinton administration is not fulfilling its responsibilities regard-
ing the burdens of illegal aliens in state prisons).
19. Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, pmbL, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-35, at
1 (1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762 ("[Inspired by the desire] to cooperate to ensure im-
proved administration of justice through the social rehabilitation of the sentenced
persons"); Convention with Europe, supra note 3, pmbL, 35 U.S.T. at 2870,22 I.LM.
at 530 ("[d]esirous of further developing international co-operation in the field of
criminal law"); H.R. Rep. No. 95-720 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146,
3149. Conversely, the transfer treaties can also cause disharmony in foreign relations.
See Transfer of Alien Prisoners Act of 1997, S. 3, 105th Cong. § 107 (1997) (withhold-
ing foreign assistance and requiring the United States to vote against loans from inter-
national development banks for nations that are parties to transfer treaties with the
United States and who do not accept for return a designated percentage of prisoners
approved for transfer by the Attorney General).
20. Abramovsky, Endangered Species, supra note 2, at 456-57; see also Inter-
American Convention, supra note 3, pmbL, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-35, at 1 (1996),
Hein's No. KAV 4762 (stating that the parties want "to ensure improved administra-
1997]
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This Note addresses the legal issues surrounding the transfer of pe-
nal sanctions treaties which are raised when prisoners in an individual
U.S. state's correctional system seek to utilize these treaties. A ten-
sion exists between the proper role of the individual states in execut-
ing transfers and the maintenance of a coherent and consistent foreign
policy regarding the transfer treaties. Part I of this Note sets forth the
constitutional, human rights, and other legal criticisms which have
been raised in the past by scholars and commentators concerning the
transfer treaties. Part II discusses the current operation of the trans-
fer treaties on both the federal and state levels of government in the
United States. Part II specifically examines transfer treaty enabling
legislation in the states of New York, California, and Ohio. Part III
analyzes the problems raised by the U.S. state enabling legislation,
which provides for state participation in the international transfer of
prisoners. Part III also critiques the transfer treaties based on their
prospects for success in light of the current U.S. state enabling legisla-
tion. Part IV proposes that the discretion of the relevant state actors
over the international transfer of prisoners should be limited and
brought into line with the goals and purposes of the transfer treaties.
In addition, part IV argues that U.S. state enabling legislation should
be promulgated or amended in each state to include: procedures for
the mandatory identification and notification of all prisoners eligible
for transfer, more explicit guidelines governing the discretionary deci-
sion making of state actors regarding international transfers, and pro-
visions for the conversion of indeterminate sentences to determinate
sentences. This Note concludes that decisions regarding the interna-
tional transfer of prisoners are a significant part of a larger foreign
policy and that these decisions should not be viewed as isolated state
issues. Consequently, states should adopt enabling legislation that re-
sults in the consistent use and operation of transfer treaties.
I. OBJECTIONS AND CprrIcisivis REGARDING THE
TRANSFER TREATIES
Since the first transfer treaty with Mexico was ratified in 1977,21
transfer treaties have come under attack for alleged constitutional vio-
lations.' More recently, scholars and commentators have moved
away from constitutional arguments and instead have criticized the
treaties on two disparate grounds. Some have argued that the transfer
tion of justice through the social rehabilitation of the sentenced persons"); Conven-
tion with Europe, supra note 3, pmbl., 35 U.S.T. at 2870,22 I.L.M. at 530 (stating that
transfer treaties "further the ends of justice and the social rehabilitation of sentenced
persons"); H.R. Rep. No. 95-720 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146, 3149
(stating that rehabilitation is one of the primary objectives of U.S. penal policy).
21. United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 8, 28 U.S.T. 7399.
22. See infra part I.A.
[Vol. 66
TRANSFER OF PENAL SANCTIONS
treaties fail to adequately recognize international human rights?3
Others support the concept of international transfer treaties, but are
dismayed by international and domestic political developments which
hinder use of the treaties and prevent the treaties from realizing their
full potential.6
A. Constitutional Criticisms
Challenges to the constitutionality of the transfer treaties fall into
two categories. Initially, transfer treaties were attacked on the
grounds that the treaties deprived Americans, who were tried abroad
and transferred to the United States, of the due process protections
which would have been available at a trial in the United States.25
Other objections focused on the operation of the transfer treaties re-
garding the prisoner's consent to transfer. This part discusses both
of these objections, which have dominated the professional commen-
tary to date.
1. Trials Abroad Lack Due Process
Some critics argue that transfer treaties are unconstitutional be-
cause they deprive Americans tried abroad of procedural due process
protections.27 One commentator has targeted the lack of an exclu-
23. See infra part I.B.
24. See infra part I.C.
25. See infra part LA.1.
26. See infra part LA.2.
27. See Abraham Abramovsky, A Critical Evaluation of the American Transfer of
Penal Sanctions Policy, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 25 [hereinafter Abramovsky, American Pol-
icy]; Abraham Abramovsky & Stephen . Eagle, A Critical Evaluation of the Mexican-
American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaty, 64 Iowa L. Rev. 275 (1979); Irwin P.
Stotzky & Alan C. Swan, Due Process Methodology and Prisoner Exchange Treaties:
Confronting an Uncertain Calculus, 62 Mlnn. L. Rev. 733 (1978); Note, Constitutional
Problems in the Execution of Foreign Penal Sentences: The Mexican-American Pris-
oner Transfer Treaty, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1500 (1977); Robert M. Emanuel, Note, Inter-
vention of Constitutional Powers: The Prisoner Transfer Treaties, 2 Fla. Int'l LJ. 203,
208,225 (1986) (arguing that an amendment to the Constitution is needed to solve the
conflict between due process and prisoner exchange treaties); Gary Gray, Comment,
The Mexican-American Penal Sentences Treaty: A Run-On Sentence, 6 Pepp. L. Rev.
149 (1978). But see Gregory Gelfand, International Penal Transfer Treaties: The Case
for an Unrestricted Multilateral Treaty, 64 B.U. L Rev. 563, 567 (1984) ("This evalua-
tion reveals not only that penal transfer treaties are constitutionally sound, but also
that many of the limitations in existing treaties.., are ... neither constitutionally
required nor otherwise desirable."); Detlev F. Vagts, A Reply to "A Critical Evalua-
tion of the Mexican-American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaty," 64 Iowa L. Rev.
325, 331-36 (1979) (defending the constitutionality of the transfer treaty with Mexico);
Liana E. Olivarez, Comment, The Mexican-American Prisoner Transfer Treaty: Cur-
rent Problems and Solutions, 30 Tex. Int'l LU. 395, 400 (1995) (arguing that constitu-
tional protections do not extend to convictions in foreign courts and changing the
situs of incarceration does not alter that principle).
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sionary rule s in foreign trials as a possible violation of due process."
This argument posits that transfer treaties allow American prosecu-
tors and law enforcement to aid and encourage the prosecution of
Americans abroad in trials not subject to the protections of proce-
dural due process, thereby making it easier and less costly to get a
conviction; the convicted American can then be transferred back to
the United States under a transfer treaty.30 There is also a less ex-
treme version of this argument which avoids insinuating a broader
conspiracy between American and foreign law enforcement. This ver-
sion charges that even without the active participation of American
law enforcement, by imprisoning Americans convicted abroad in trials
lacking due process protections, the United States is affirming and en-
forcing unconstitutional convictions.3 '
The courts have not been willing to find constitutional flaws with
the transfer treaties on the ground that Americans convicted abroad
are entitled to trials with constitutional due process protections if they
are to be transferred back to the United States.32 This applies to
Americans convicted abroad even where American law enforcement
is integrally involved in apprehending the American suspect.33 The
refusal to recognize due process violations is consistent with the con-
gressional understanding of the transfer treaties.M The courts have
relied on the principle, originating in Neely v. Henkel,35 that an Amer-
ican citizen who commits a crime in a foreign country must submit to
28. The exclusionary rule prevents the introduction at trial of evidence which was
obtained in contravention of a defendant's constitutional rights. See Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206-07 (1964);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658-60 (1961).
29. Abramovsky, Endangered Species, supra note 2, at 478; Abramovsky & Eagle,
supra note 27, at 302-03; see also Abramovsky, American Policy, supra note 27, at 40-
41 (describing a hypothetical scenario in which American law enforcement circum-
vents the exclusionary rule by supplying foreign officials with illegally obtained evi-
dence and having the foreign officials arrest and try the American abroad).
30. See Abramovsky, Endangered Species, supra note 2, at 477-78; Abramovsky &
Eagle, supra note 27, at 321.
31. See Abramovsky, American Policy, supra note 27, at 35 ("By ratifying [a trans-
fer] treaty, the United States enforces the sentences imposed by [certain foreign]
courts, and in effect ratifies judgments secured in a criminal justice system plagued
with inefficiency and corruption."); see also Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 27, at
310 ("Ordinarily American courts will not enforce the penal laws of a foreign
nation.").
32. Kanasola v. Civiletti, 630 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1980); Mitchell v. United States,
483 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
33. Abramovsky, Endangered Species, supra note 2, at 478. But see H.R. Rep. No.
95-720 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146, 3165 (explaining that an Ameri-
can convicted abroad with the aid of unconstitutional actions by American law en-
forcement could challenge the right of the United States to maintain custody over
him, but not the conviction itself).
34. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-720 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146, 3164-
65.
35. 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
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the modes of trial as the laws of that country prescribe.' This princi-
ple also recognizes the sovereignty of foreign nations.37 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has stated that the Constitution "ha[s] no relation
to crimes committed [outside] the jurisdiction of the United States
against the laws of a foreign country."' 3
2. Validity of a Prisoner's Consent to Transfer to the United States
Other critiques of the constitutionality of the transfer treaties are
more focused on specific provisions of the transfer treaties. This cate-
gory questions the validity of an American offender's consent to a
transfer to the United States.39 These arguments challenge the valid-
ity of the prisoner's consent, first, on grounds of duress1° and second,
based on the unconstitutionality of the prisoner's waiving his right to
appeal his conviction.41 A prisoner transferring home to the United
States waives the right to appeal when his consent is verified and
made irrevocable.42 Neither version of this argument has met with
any sustained success in American courts.
In post-transfer challenges, the courts have been unwilling to invali-
date transfers based on "duress induced by the conditions of confine-
ment in a foreign penitentiary. ' 43 Because one of the United States'
purposes in entering into prisoner transfer treaties was to alleviate the
inhumane prison conditions suffered by Americans in foreign coun-
36. Id. at 123; see Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3, at 418 (quoting Neely, 180 U.S. at
122-23). In Neely, the Court upheld the constitutionality of an act of Congress which
provided for the extradition of any person in the United States for trial in a foreign
country under the laws of that country. Neely, 180 U.S. at 122-23.
37. See Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3, at 418.
38. Neely, 180 U.S. at 122; see Mitchell v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 291, 294
(E.D. Wis. 1980) (quoting Neely, 180 U.S. at 122-23); Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3,
at 418.
39. See, e.g., Abramovsky, American Policy, supra note 27, at 43 (arguing that pris-
oners' agreeing to transfer is duress induced when the prisoner is under horrid and
inhumane prison conditions); Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 27, at 299 (question-
ing the voluntariness of an offender's consent to transfer when given in the face of
horrid or torturous prison conditions); Emanuel, supra note 27, at 208 ("To activate
the treaty, therefore, one must waive certain constitutional rights."); Olivarez, supra
note 27, at 401-02 (setting out responses to the argument that an offender's waiving
his right to petition for habeas corpus is invalid).
40. See Abramovsky, American Policy, supra note 27, at 43 (arguing that prison-
ers' agreeing to transfer is duress induced when the prisoner is under horrid and inhu-
mane prison conditions); Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 27, at 299 (questioning the
voluntariness of an offender's consent to transfer when given in the face of horrid or
torturous prison conditions).
41. See Abramovsky, American Policy, supra note 27, at 58-59; Abramovsky &
Eagle, supra note 27, at 300-02 (questioning the constitutionality of a transfer treaty
which forces the offender to waive the right to appeal his conviction). But see
Olivarez, supra note 27, at 401-02 (setting out responses to the argument that an of-
fender's waiver of his right to petition for habeas corpus is invalid).
42. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4107-4109 (1994); see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
43. Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3, at 403; see Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179
(2d Cir. 1980); Boyden v. Bell, 631 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1980); Mitchell, 483 F. Supp. 291.
1997]
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tries," it is clear that American officials know the nature and extent of
these inhumane conditions.45 Nevertheless, the courts have found
that prisoners' decisions to consent to transfer were the product of
rational decision making.' Because of the consent verification proce-
dures in the federal enabling legislation, prisoners must formally con-
sent to a transfer or ratify consent previously given.47 Thus, this
process further undermines any claim of duress by allowing the courts
to justify their refusal to entertain duress claims. 8
A second objection, based explicitly on constitutional grounds,
claims that both transfer treaties and the federal enabling legislation
are unconstitutional because they require the waiver of the constitu-
tional right to appeal a conviction or make a collateral attack upon the
foreign conviction.49 It is not disputed that the treaties and the legisla-
tion provide that a transferred prisoner cannot attack his conviction in
the receiving state, even if that conviction occurred without constitu-
tional due process protections.5 0 Nevertheless, courts have found that
44. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
45. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-720 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146, 3146-
47.
46. Rosado, 621 F.2d at 1191 (noting that "viewed in light of the alternatives legiti-
mately available" the "decisions were voluntarily and intelligently made"); Mitchell,
483 F. Supp. at 294 (rejecting the petitioner's argument that his consent was not vol-
untary because he would have agreed to anything to secure his release from a Mexi-
can prison). Although there is abundant evidence that Americans imprisoned abroad
are often singled out for torture or, at best, generally less favorable treatment than
other prisoners, some Americans might prefer to serve their sentences abroad. In
foreign prisons, prisoners with money are often able to buy excellent accommoda-
tions, high quality meals, and personal servants. Abramovsky, Endangered Species,
supra note 2, at 455 & n.21. Furthermore, prisoners in Mexico are eligible for conju-
gal visits. Id at 455 n.21; Olivarez, supra note 27, at 402.
47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4107-4109.
48. See, e.g., Boyden, 631 F.2d at 123 ("Allegations of duress caused by the condi-
tions of his confinement . . . would not support a finding that this transfer was
involuntary.").
49. See Abramovsky, American Policy, supra note 27, at 58-59; Abramovsky &
Eagle, supra note 27, at 300-02; Olivarez, supra note 27, at 401 (pointing out the criti-
cism of the fact that transferred prisoners are deemed to have waived their rights to
seek a writ of habeas corpus); see, e.g., Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 615
F.2d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1980) (describing the plaintiff's argument that the transfer
treaty with Mexico denies a transferred prisoner the right to challenge the constitu-
tionality of his foreign conviction in a United States court).
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 3244(1) (1994) (stating that "the country in which the offender
was convicted shall have exclusive jurisdiction and competence over proceedings
seeking to challenge, modify, or set aside convictions or sentences handed down by a
court of such country"); Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, art. VIII, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 104-35, at 4 (1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762 ("The sentencing state shall retain
full jurisdiction for the review of sentences issued by its courts."); Convention with
Europe, supra note 3, art. 10, 35 U.S.T. 2867, 2876,22 I.L.M. 530, 533-34 ("In the case
of continued enforcement, the [receiving] State shall be bound by the legal nature and
duration of the sentence as determined by the sentencing State.").
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these provisions of the treaties and the enabling legislation do not vio-
late the constitutional fights of the prisoners.,
The courts have held that the prisoner's consent, prior to his trans-
fer, operates as "a waiver of, or at least an agreement not to assert,
any constitutional rights the offender might have regarding his or her
conviction. '52 A waiver is valid if it is knowingly and voluntarily
made, the waiving party has access to counsel, and the waiving party
consents with full knowledge of the consequences.53 Because the fed-
eral enabling legislation provides for all these opportunities, any
prisoner whose consent is verified in accordance with the enabling leg-
islation will be deemed to have waived any right to challenge his for-
eign conviction.55 Furthermore, waiver of the right to challenge the
conviction was deemed an essential ingredient in negotiating transfer
treaties, and Congress did not suggest any less intrusive means.56
Although the prisoner cannot challenge the fact of his conviction, the
prisoner can seek a writ of habeas corpuss7 based on the manner of
execution of the sentence,58 such as the conversion of his foreign sen-
tence to a domestic sentence.59
51. Pfeifer, 615 F.2d at 876 (holding that the lack of constitutionality in a convic-
tion abroad does not render a transfer treaty unconstitutional or entitle a transferred
prisoner to relief); Kanasola v. Civiletti, 630 F.2d 472, 474 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding
that the transfer treaty with Canada does not violate the rights of a prisoner transfer-
ring home to the United States by denying American courts the jurisdiction to collat-
erally review the conviction); Mitchell, 483 F. Supp. at 294 (holding that U.S. courts do
not have jurisdiction to hear any appeals of the transferred prisoner's conviction and,
even if there were jurisdiction, the conviction and sentence by the transferring state
are immune from attack). Only a few courts have granted relief on the basis of for-
eign officials' involvement in a joint venture with American law enforcement or
where the foreign trial "lacked any semblance of due process." Abramovsky, Ameri-
can Policy, supra note 27, at 56-59; see Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 27, at 303-05
(discussing how cooperation between American and Mexican law enforcement could
constitute a joint venture and thereby prevent incarceration in the United States of an
American convicted in Mexico).
52. Pfeifer, 615 F.2d at 876.
53. See id.
54. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4108-4109 (1994).
55. It is also possible that courts will not reach the question of the constitutionality
of a waiver because a waiver requires relinquishment of a vested right, and Americans
imprisoned abroad may "have no right to relief from United States courts." Pfeifer,
615 F.2d at 876.
56. See H.LR. Rep. No. 95-720 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146, 3164-
65.
57. A writ of habeas corpus raises the issue of whether the petitioner is being
lawfully retained, not the petitioner's guilt or innocence. Black's Law Dictionary 709
(6th ed. 1990).
58. Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3, at 418.
59. These challenges involve credit for "good time," other probationary matters,
and converting foreign sentences to domestic ones under the federal sentencing
guidelines. See Cannon v. United States Dep't of Justice, 973 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir.
1992); Hansen v. United States Parole Comm'n, 904 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1990); Thorpe
v. United States Parole Conim'n, 902 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1990); Herrmann v. Meese,
849 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1988); Boyden v. Bell, 631 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1980).
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The discussion above addresses how the international transfer trea-
ties have been criticized on various constitutional grounds. The
courts, Congress, and the executive branch, however, have not ob-
jected to the treaties on constitutional grounds. Accordingly, constitu-
tional criticism is no longer a constructive addition to the debate over
transfer treaties.
B. International Human Rights Perspective
A second group of commentators have criticized the transfer trea-
ties from an international human rights perspective. 60 This is an ap-
propriate perspective for criticism: the treaties purport to seek justice
and, therefore, must take into account the rights and needs of the pris-
oner.6 1 This Note, however, is primarily concerned with the proper
operation of the treaties and the prospects for their success in light of
domestic political norms and institutions.62 Nevertheless, the human
rights perspective makes several persuasive points.
The human rights perspective argues that the primary purpose of
transfer treaties is to benefit the individual prisoner, and only secon-
darily to benefit the states participating in the transfer.63 This view of
the purpose of transfer treaties is a major departure from more com-
mon perspectives on the purpose of the treaties, which view the trea-
ties in the scope of international relations as well as the benefits the
treaties may deliver to the individual. 64 The human rights perspective
addresses how transfer treaties can be made more effective by remov-
ing the impediments to transfer which do not serve humanitarian
goals.65 For example, if the purpose of transfer treaties is to allow
60. See, e.g., Gelfand, supra note 27, at 566, 573 (rejecting constitutional objec-
tions to transfer treaties and criticizing provisions of the treaties which are counter-
productive to their humanitarian purpose); Michael Plachta, Human Rights Aspects of
the Prisoner Transfer in a Comparative Perspective, 53 La. L. Rev. 1043 (1993) (dis-
cussing the role of humanitarian and human rights concerns in the international trans-
fer of prisoners); Gregory D. Gisvold, Note, Strangers in a Strange Land: Assessing
the Fate of Foreign Nationals Arrested in the United States by State and Local Authori-
ties, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 771 (1994) (discussing how the treaty-based international rights
of foreigners are being violated in the United States).
61. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, pmbl., S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-
35, at 1 (1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762 ("[inspired by the desire] to cooperate to ensure
improved administration of justice through the social rehabilitation of the sentenced
persons"); Convention with Europe, supra note 3, pmbl., 35 U.S.T. 2867, 2870, 22
I.L.M. 530, 530 ("[c]onsidering that such co-operation [between nations] should fur-
ther the ends of justice and the social rehabilitation of sentenced persons"); H.R. Rep.
No. 95-720 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146, 3149 ("The most fundamentaljustification for offender exchange treaties is human rights.").
62. Accordingly, it will not undertake an extensive discussion of the merits of ar-
guments from an international human rights perspective.
63. See, e.g., Plachta, supra note 60, at 1043.
64. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
65. See Gelfand, supra note 27, at 566, 573; Plachta, supra note 60, at 1044 (exam-
ining how the conditions imposed on the transfer of prisoners relate to humanitarian
and rehabilitative goals).
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prisoners to be returned to the country with which they have genuine
ties, then citizenship, country of origin, and current domicile should
not be dispositive factors.'
The human rights perspective, like the constitutional objections,
also focuses on the prisoner's consent to his transfer under a treaty.67
Under the human rights perspective, consent of the prisoner is essen-
tial to justify the use of transfer treaties.6s Furthermore, this perspec-
tive *argues that prisoners should be informed of the possibilities and
legal consequences of transfer to ensure that there is informed con-
sent,69 and the receiving state should be able to verify that the pris-
oner's consent was properly and freely given.70
It is probable that in the wake of United States v. Alvarez-
Machain,71 the human rights perspective, which relies on general prin-
ciples of international law, will not be successful in American courts.
In that case, the Supreme Court disregarded, or at least downplayed,
the importance of general principles and customary practices of inter-
national law.' In Alvarez-Machain, the United States offered a re-
ward for the defendant, who was charged with torturing and
murdering an American DEA agent-73 Two Mexican policemen kid-
napped the defendant and delivered him to American authorities at
the border.74 Despite a willingness to admit that the U.S. government
may have acted in violation of general principles of international
law,75 the Court would not limit the power of the government based
66. Plachta, supra note 60, at 1045-49. Under transfer treaties in their current
form, the prisoner must be a citizen of the receiving state to qualify for transfer. See
supra note 8 and accompanying text.
67. See Plachta, supra note 60, at 1049-72.
68. Id. at 1050-51. Consent by the prisoner is essential because, under the human
rights perspective, "an important objective of transfer is to further the interests of the
prisoner." Id. at 1050. Transfer differs from deportation and extradition because
those are acts of a state carried out in the public interest. Id. Although all transfer
treaties to which the United States is a party require the consent of the prisoner, there
are treaties among other nations which do not require the prisoner's consent. See id.
at 1056-59. But cf. infra note 207 (discussing the possibility that the consent of foreign
prisoners in the United States might not be necessary at some time in the future).
69. Plachta, supra note 60, at 1059.
70. IL at 1065-66.
71. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
72. See id. at 666-69.
73. Erika E. Barnes, The Practice of International Prisoner Transfer Treaties, 10
Int'l Enforcement L. Rep. 238, 241 (1994).
74. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657; Barnes, supra note 73, at 241.
75. While the court's decision does not address what these general principles are,
Justice Stevens does so in his dissent. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 680-81 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). Some of these principles are: a state will not perform an act of
sovereignty in the territory of another state, a state will not send its agents into an-
other state to apprehend persons accused of a crime, and a state violates international
law and shows gross disrespect for humankind when it abducts a person in a foreign
country. IL (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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on such principles.76 As a result, it is unlikely that American courts
will utilize the human rights perspective as the basis for decisions in
this area.
C. International and Domestic Develovments Which Undermine the
Transfer Treaties
In addition to the constitutional objections and human rights per-
spectives, a third type of critique exists regarding the transfer treaties.
This critique recognizes the benefits and successes of the transfer trea-
ties, but argues that international and domestic political developments
pose the greatest threat to the effectiveness of the treaties.77
One commentator, who originally challenged the use of transfer
treaties on constitutional grounds,78 has come to appreciate the poten-
tial benefits of transfer treaties.7 9 This commentator has argued that,
unfortunately, other aspects of foreign policy and international poli-
tics undermine transfer treaties.8 0 For example, when agents of the
United States forcibly abduct suspects abroad and bring them to the
United States for trial, as was done in Alvarez-Machain, the United
States both ignores and undermines transfer treaties, extradition trea-
ties, and other maxims of international cooperation.8' The practice of
abducting foreign suspects could lead to repercussions by other na-
tions, including a refusal to accept or grant prisoner transfer
requests.82
In addition to unilateral abduction of suspects abroad, the United
States' increased use of passive personality jurisdiction could also un-
dermine transfer treaties and the cooperation necessary for their suc-
cess.8 3 Passive personality jurisdiction allows a state to assert
76. See id. at 669; see also Barnes, supra note 73, at 241 (stating that the "Clinton
administration has basically taken the position of the Bush administration, which is
not to endorse abduction, but not to exclude the practice formally"). Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has never repudiated Ker v. Illinois, which held that forcible ab-
duction of a defendant from another country for trial in the United States was not a
violation of due process. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 660-61 (discussing Ker v.
Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886)).
77. See, e.g., Abramovsky, Endangered Species, supra note 2 (arguing that transfer
treaties are effective and enforceable, but have been undermined by the United
States' resorting to unilateral abductions).
78. Abramovsky, American Policy, supra note 27, at 40-45, 56-59; Abramovsky &
Eagle, supra note 27, at 302-16.
79. See Abramovsky, Endangered Species, supra note 2, at 456-57, 486 (stating that
the transfer treaties benefit the person imprisoned abroad and that the failure of the
treaties would harm Americans imprisoned abroad).
80. Id.
81. See id. at 468-76; supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
82. Mexico formally protested Alvarez-Machain's abduction and requested the
extradition from the United States of two individuals it suspected were involved in the
abduction on charges of kidnaping. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655,
669 & n.16 (1992).
83. See Abramovsky, Endangered Species, supra note 2, at 482-83.
[Vol. 66
TRANSFER OF PENAL SANCTIONS
jurisdiction over those defendants who commit criminal conduct
against the state's citizens, even if that conduct occurs abroad.' a Thus,
passive personality jurisdiction focuses on the nationality of the
crime's victim, thereby disregarding more universally accepted theo-
ries of jurisdictionas5
Another view of the effect of international developments on trans-
fer treaties focuses on the potential for expanding the treaties in the
wake of increased international economic and political integration. 6
One proponent of this view suggests that the NAFTA agreement sig-
nifies the beginning of a larger economic integration and globaliza-
tion; these economic forces can combine with political integration to
bring about supranational approaches to cooperation in criminal law
and, specifically, the transfer of prisoners.87 Unfortunately, there is
also the possibility that the rapidly changing status of international
criminal law and reliance on out-dated political and criminal institu-
tions will cause greater difficulties for nations seeking to cooperate in
areas of criminal law and the international transfer of prisoners.as
Scholars and commentators who take the perspective that interna-
tional and domestic political developments affect the success and
goals of transfer treaties have provided useful criticisms of transfer
treaties. An analysis of transfer treaties from a practical perspective
which accounts for international and domestic political realities is the
most advantageous approach. The courts have made it clear that
transfer treaties and the federal enabling legislation do not violate the
constitutional rights of Americans who are transferred to the United
States or the rights of foreign nationals who seek to transfer out of the
United States.89 The humanitarian and international human rights
criticisms of transfer treaties fail to account for the realities of the
international system; states act in an altruistic manner only when the
incentives to do so outweigh the costs of other behavior.
Transfer treaties are successful due to the reciprocal nature of the
treaties: states have equal power to veto a transfer under the treaties;
84. Id
85. Id For a discussion of the United States' use of passive personality jurisdic-
tion against a terrorist who hijacked a Jordanian airliner with three Americans on
board and the implications of that case, see Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: The United States Unwarranted Attempt to Alter International Law in
United States v. Yunis, 15 Yale J. Int'l L. 121 (1990).
86. See Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3.
87. Id at 438.
88. Id at 445.
89. See supra part LA.
90. This logic is demonstrated by the Transfer of Alien Prisoners Act, proposed in
the Senate. See Transfer of Alien Prisoners Act of 1997, S. 3, 105th Cong. § 107
(1997). In this bill, Congress seeks to tie a country's refusal to accept prisoners ap-
proved for transfer to a reduction in foreign assistance or development loans. See id.
Thus, if the bill becomes law, the economic incentive to accept transferred prisoners
will outweigh the economic incentive to refuse them.
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a transfer requires cooperation from two states; and states have no
incentive to relinquish their ultimate decision making authority to the
individual prisoner or any other international organization.91 Accord-
ingly, the proper perspective for analyzing the current efficacy of
transfer treaties focuses on the international norms and domestic insti-
tutions which govern the operation of the treaties. Domestic institu-
tions, such as U.S. state enabling legislation, pose a threat to the
success of international transfer treaties because state enabling legisla-
tion directly affects the operation of the transfer treaties.
The next part of this Note addresses the operation of transfer trea-
ties on both the federal and state levels. Federal and state enabling
legislation govern the practical application of the treaties. Because of
poorly crafted and unenforced enabling legislation, the success of the
transfer treaties relies on the willingness of federal and state actors to
comply with the mandate and spirit of the treaties.
II. TRANSFER TREATIES AND ENABLING LEGISLATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
Even if a prisoner satisfies the specific criteria required by the trans-
fer treaty,92 a nation may still refuse to transfer a prisoner because the
ultimate decision to execute a transfer is a discretionary one.93 In the
United States, the Attorney General must consent to the transfer of
prisoners out of American prisons.94 The federal enabling legislation
for the transfer treaties states that the Attorney General "is author-
ized... to make regulations for the proper implementation of [trans-
fer of penal sanctions] treaties. '95 The Attorney General has adopted
regulations allowing the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to receive
and transfer custody of prisoners under transfer treaties,96 providing
procedures for the transfer of prisoners,97 and approving the receipt of
prisoners from U.S. states for transfer abroad. 98
A. Discretion over Transfer Decisions on the Federal Level
Foreign nationals imprisoned in the United States and American
citizens imprisoned abroad have sought relief in federal courts be-
91. See Barnes, supra note 73, at 239 & n.5.
92. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
93. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, arts. V(6), VI, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 104-35, at 3-4 (1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762; Convention with Europe, supra note
3, art. 3(1)(f), 35 U.S.T. 2867, 2872, 22 I.L.M. 530, 531; see also Abramovsky, Endan-
gered Species, supra note 2, at 463-64 (setting forth various factors transfer treaties
suggest should be used by the sentencing state when deciding whether to transfer a
prisoner and noting the wide latitude this gives to the sentencing state's decision).
94. 10 U.S.C. § 955(a) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 4102(3) (1994).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 4102(4).
96. 28 C.F.R. § 527.40 (1995).
97. Id. § 527.44.
98. L § 527.45.
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cause the Attorney General has never formally and officially com-
posed or adopted regulations to provide a framework for deciding
whether to grant a transfer request.99 The Seventh and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits have rejected these claims. 10 Those courts have held
that 18 U.S.C. § 4102(4) "does not require the Attorney General to
issue substantive regulations."' 1
In Scalise v. Thomburgh,'° the court endeavored to distill congres-
sional intent to determine whether § 4102(4) imposed "a mandatory
obligation to issue substantive regulations governing the Attorney
General's exercise of discretion."'1 3 The Seventh Circuit considered
"the language of the statute; the legislative history; and the interpreta-
tion given by the administrative agency charged with enforcing the
statute" to determine congressional intent.10' The Scalise court noted
that because the statute "does not provide that the Attorney General
'shall' issue regulations," the language of the statute does not impose
a mandatory duty to issue regulations. 05 When the express language
of a statute is clear, a court would not normally need to look further to
interpret it.'06
While Scalise accepted that the statutory language did not impose a
mandatory obligation to issue regulations, the court also stated that
"the context in which this language [of § 4102(4)] is stated does not
clearly imply that it is permissive." 07 Accordingly, the court ex-
99. See, eg., Bagguley v. Bush, 953 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Scalise v. Meese, 687
F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev'd sub. nom Scalise v. Thornburgh, 891 F.2d 640 (7th
Cir. 1989). The Justice Department has never published binding rules regarding the
transfer of prisoners. Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3, at 409. Such rules would de-
crease the department's discretion. Id. at 409-10. Within the Justice Department, the
Office of Enforcement Operations has written internal guidelines and considers the
following factors when deciding a prisoner's eligibility for transfer: whether the pris-
oner has paid fines or restitution if ordered to do so; whether return or transfer of a
prisoner would outrage public sensibilities; whether the prisoner constitutes a threat
to American security or law enforcement; whether the prisoner would engage in an
activity that is part of a pattern of criminal activity; whether the prisoner is under
investigation for other crimes; whether the prisoner can provide information regard-
ing other crimes under investigation; the nature of the prisoner's offense; and other
factors appropriate to consider in a specific case. kIL at 410-124 see also 6 Michael
Abbell & Bruno A. Ristau, International Judicial Assistance A-29837 to A-298.42
(1995) (giving the full text of the guidelines adopted by the Office of Enforcement
Operations).
100. Bagguley, 953 F.2d 660; Scalise, 891 F.2d 640.
101. Bagguley, 953 F.2d at 662; accord Scalise, 891 F.2d at 647 ("[W]e conclude that
Congress did not intend § 4102(4) to impose a mandatory obligation on the Attorney
General to issue substantive regulations in the exercise of his discretion in prisoner
transfer decisions.").
102. 891 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1989).
103. Id. at 644.
104. Id. (quoting United States v. Markgra, 736 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1984)).
105. Id; accord Bagguley, 953 F.2d at 662.
106. See Scalise, 891 F.2d at 644 n.5.
107. Il
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amined the legislative history of the statute.'0 8 Regarding § 4102(4),
the House Judiciary Committee stated that "[it] expects the Attorney
General to promptly establish regulations and to provide standards
and guidelines which will govern the exercise of his discretion as to his
consent to receive or transfer offenders."'109 The Scalise court failed to
note that the Committee also stated that "[i]n most cases, and possibly
almost all cases, [the Attorney General] should agree to any receipt or
transfer, if the offender requests or voluntarily consents to such trans-
fer.""'  The Scalise court concluded that the Committee's expression
of an "expectation" did not establish congressional intent and that the
language of the House Report was not dispositive."'
Finally, Scalise examined the interpretation given to § 4102(4) by
the Justice Department, the agency charged with enforcing it.1 2 On
behalf of the Justice Department, the Attorney General maintained
that § 4102(4) imposed no mandatory obligation to issue substantive
regulations governing his exercise of discretion in prisoner trans-
fers. 1 3 The court found that this interpretation by the Attorney Gen-
eral further supported its ruling. 1 1 4 The court was giving substantial
deference to the Attorney General. 115
In addition to claiming that the Attorney General was required to
furnish formal regulations addressing her discretion to transfer and
receive prisoners under the transfer treaties, imprisoned offenders
have also sought judicial relief on the grounds that their requests for
transfer to or from the United States were wrongfully denied by the
Attorney General." 6 The courts have unanimously denied relief to
claims brought on this ground.117
The courts have denied this relief by analyzing two aspects of the
Attorney General's decision, and giving both of those aspects a pre-
sumption in the Attorney General's favor. First, the courts have ex-
108. Id at 644-45.
109. Id at 644-45 n.6 (emphasis added) (quoting Committee Report of the House
Judiciary Committee, H.R. Rep. No. 95-720, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146,
3155).
110. H.R. Rep. No. 95-720 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146, 3155.
111. Scalise, 891 F.2d at 645.
112. Id at 647.
113. Id
114. Id
115. See id.; see also Bagguley v. Bush, 953 F.2d 660, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating
that "a court should defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute that [the agency] is
charged with implementing, so long as that interpretation is a permissible one").
116. See, e.g., Marquez-Ramos v. Reno, 69 F.3d 477,479-80 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating
plaintiff's claim that the Attorney General's duty to transfer him is nondiscretionary);
Bagguley, 953 F.2d at 661 (challenging the denial of a request for transfer to Eng-
land); Scalise, 891 F.2d at 643 (stating plaintiffs' claim that the "failure of the Attorney
General to provide them with a hearing prior to denial of [their transfer] request
violated their fifth amendment rights").
117. See Marquez-Ramos, 69 F.3d 477; Bagguley, 953 F.2d 660; Scalise, 891 F.2d
640.
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amined the factors the Attorney General might use to consider the
transfer request.118 As discussed above, courts have agreed that the
Attorney General is not required to follow any specific guidelines in
making her decision." 9 Second, the courts have noted in cursory fash-
ion that the Attorney General's decisions were based on facts under-
lying the prisoner's incarceration.'- Thus, the courts have given
substantial deference to the Attorney General's exercise of discretion
in light of the facts presented. This judicial deference is based on the
"unique nature" of transfer decisions.U1 Scalise compared the deci-
sion whether to transfer a prisoner internationally to the decision
whether to transfer a prisoner among intrastate institutions; the court
decided that both decisions revolve around the same penological con-
siderations."-2 The Scalise court stated that interprison transfers be-
tween institutions in a single state "are made for a variety of reasons
and often involve no more than informed predictions as to what would
best serve institutional security or the safety and welfare of the in-
mate."' 23 Because the court regarded an international transfer as
analogous to an intrastate transfer, the Attorney General received the
benefit of wide discretion. 24 Not every court which has considered
the merits of a transfer decision, however, has failed to note the inter-
national significance of such a decision?- s
By allowing the Attorney General to forgo establishing guidelines
for considering a transfer and giving the Attorney General substantial
deference regarding the ultimate transfer decision, courts have as-
sured that almost any decision made by the Attorney General will be
upheld.- 6 Despite the Attorney General's unfettered discretion, this
118. Marquez-Ramos, 69 F.3d at 480; Scalise, 891 F.2d at 646.
119. See supra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
120. See Marquez-Ramos, 69 F.3d at 481 ("As long as the Attorney General had
the discretion, which she did, and exercised it within the framework of the Treaty,
which she also did, Mr. Marquez-Ramos is not entitled to mandamus relief."); Scalise,
891 F.2d at 646 ("While these considerations may not appease those most intimately
concerned, it is not our job to second guess the Attorney General's weighing of these
considerations in his decision-making process.").
121. Scalise, 891 F.2d at 645; see Marquez-Ramos, 69 F3d at 480 (stating that "the
particular context in which transfer decisions are made cannot be ignored" and hold-
ing that transfer decisions are discretionary).
122. Scalise, 891 F.2d at 645-46.
123. Id. at 645 (citing Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1102 (7th Cir. 1982)) (quot-
ing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226 (1976)).
124. See id
125. Marquez-Ramos, 69 F.3d at 480 (stating that the Attorney General's wide dis-
cretion is further justified by the fact that transfer "determinations have international
and political ramifications that cannot be relegated to mere ministerial actions").
126. There is also the possibility that the Attorney General's decision is beyond the
jurisdiction of the court, thus making the decision immune from judicial review. As
an alternative ground for its decision, Scalise held that under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, in the absence of standards upon which a court can review the Attorney
General's discretionary authority and with a finding that there is no mandatory obli-
gation to issue substantive regulations, the Attorney General's discretionary decision
1997]
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Note does not argue that the Attorney General is unjustifiably re-
jecting prisoners' transfer requests. For example, in Scalise, the Attor-
ney General denied the prisoner's transfer request because of the
"relative seriousness of [the prisoner's] offense; his extensive criminal
record; the manner of his return to the United Kingdom; his 'A' secur-
ity classification in the United Kingdom, the highest security category;
and, the likelihood that a transfer would not further his rehabilita-
tion.' 1 27 Thus, at this time, it does not appear that the Attorney Gen-
eral is abusing her wide discretion.
Notwithstanding the judicial interpretation of § 4102, not all of the
transfer of penal sanctions treaties give the Attorney General such
wide discretion. For example, the treaty between the United States
and Mexico" requires that the Attorney General:
bear in mind all factors bearing upon the probability that the trans-
fer will contribute to the social rehabilitation of the offender, in-
cluding the nature and severity of his offense and his previous
criminal record, if any, his medical condition, the strength of his
connections by residence, presence in the territory, family relations
and otherwise to the social life of the Transferring State and the
Receiving State. 29
Addressing the impact of this language, the Tenth Circuit held that
where the Attorney General rejected a transfer request based upon
"the seriousness of the offense and the prisoner's significant ties to the
United States,"'3 the Attorney General had exercised her discretion
within the framework of the treaty.' 3' The Tenth Circuit granted even
wider deference under 18 U.S.C. § 4102 to the Attorney General than
had other courts.' 32 The court did not undertake any analysis of the
Attorney General's decision making process as it related to the man-
date of the treaty. 33
is not reviewable. Scalise, 891 F.2d at 648-49; see also Bagguley v. Bush, 953 F.2d 660,
662 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that both the Convention with Europe and 18 U.S.C.
§ 4102(4) give the Attorney General "unfettered discretion with respect to transfer
decisions" and thus are not reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act).
127. Scalise, 891 F.2d at 646.
128. United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 8, 28 U.S.T. 7399.
129. 1& art. IV(4), 28 U.S.T. at 7404; see also Inter-American Convention, supra
note 3, art. V(6), S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-35, at 3 (1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762 (listing
factors the transferring state "may consider").
130. Marquez-Ramos, 69 F.3d at 478.
131. See id at 481.
132. See supra notes 99-115, 119-121, and accompanying text.
133. See Marquez-Ramos, 69 F.3d at 478 (noting that the Attorney General has the
discretion to make the transfer decision and the record indicates that the Attorney
General has assessed the merits of the transfer, but failing to discuss the Attorney
General's decision).
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B. Discretion over International Transfers on the State Level
The individual states of the United States are not parties to interna-
tional treaties.13 Accordingly, the U.S. states may not be directly
bound by specific provisions of transfer treaties.135 The multilateral
transfer agreement with Europe simply does not address the role of
sovereign states or provinces within a signatory nation 36 In contrast,
the bilateral treaty between the United States and Mexico on the
transfer of sentenced persons addresses the role of sovereign states
within each nation. Article Four of that treaty states that "[i]f the
offender was sentenced by the courts of a state of one of the Parties,
the approval of the authorities of that state, as well as that of the Fed-
eral Authority, shall be required."'3 7
Notwithstanding the inclusion of specific language contemplating
the participation of individual states or provinces in some interna-
tional transfer treaties and omission of the language from other trea-
ties, individual states may take part in any of the international transfer
treaties. 38 To participate, states, like the federal government, must
have enabling legislation which allows them to transfer foreign prison-
ers from the state correctional system to the federal government; the
federal government is then able to transfer the sentenced person to his
home country under the relevant treaty.139 Forty states have enacted
legislation of this sort.1 0
134. Technically, only the United States is a party to international treaties. See Car-
los M Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 Colum. L Rev.
1082, 1082 (1992). Thus, only prisoners incarcerated for federal crimes automatically
qualify for the possiblity of transfer under transfer treaties. Furthermore, individuals
do not possess rights under treaties, but attain them only derivatively through a na-
tion party to a treaty. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992);
Vdzquez, supra, at 1082 (stating that "treaties... establish legal obligations and cor-
relative legal rights only of the nations that are parties to them, not of individuals").
135. See Hogan v. Koenig, 920 F.2d 6, 8 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the State of
California is not a party to the transfer treaty between the United States and Canada
and thus is not bound by the terms of the treaty); Walton v. Department of Correc-
tions, 538 N.W.2d 66, 68 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the transfer treaty be-
tween the United States and Canada does not restrict the discretion of the State of
Michigan in consenting to the transfer of a state prisoner to Canada because Michigan
is not a party to the treaty).
136. See Convention with Europe, supra note 3, 35 U.S.T. 2867, 22 LLM. 530.
137. United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 8, art. IV(5), 28 U.S.T. at 7404; see
also Inter-American Treaty, supra note 3, art. V(3), S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-35, at 3
(1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762 ("If the sentence was handed down by a state or prov-
ince with criminal jurisdiction independent from that of the federal government, the
approval of the authorities of that state or province shall be required for the applica-
tion of this transfer procedure.").
138. See Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3, at 412-13, 424.
139. See Barnes, supra note 73, at 241 ("Not all states have legislation enabling
them to deliver foreign prisoners to federal authorities for transfer.").
140. The states which have enacted this enabling legislation are: Alabama, see Ala.
Code § 15-9-100 (1995), Alaska, see Alaska Stat. § 33.30.291 (Michie 1996), Arizona,
see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-105 (West 1992), Arkansas, see Ark. Code Ann. § 12-
27-121 (Mlcihie 1995), California, see Cal. Gov't Code § 12012.1 (West 1992), Colo-
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The vast majority of states with statutes enabling participation in a
transfer treaty have authorized the state governor to consent to the
transfer of foreign prisoners to a foreign nation pursuant to a treaty.
Six states have authorized the governor or the governor's designee to
consent to the transfer. 141 Four states-Alaska, Connecticut, New
York, and Utah-have empowered the commissioner of the depart-
ment of corrections to consent to the transfer of prisoners under a
treaty.142 Furthermore, twenty-six of the forty states with enabling
legislation have authorized the governor or the commissioner of the
department of corrections to "take any other action necessary to initi-
ate the participation" of the state in a transfer treaty.1
43
A survey of the U.S. state enabling legislation reveals that most
states have utilized concise, boilerplate language in the enabling stat-
rado, see Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-60-2301 (Bradford 1988), Connecticut, see Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 18-91a (West Supp. 1997), Florida, see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 944.596
(West 1985), Hawaii, see Haw. Rev. Stat. § 353-16.5 (1993), Idaho, see Idaho Code
§ 20-104 (1997), Illinois, see 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/3-2-3.1 (West 1992), Indiana,
see Ind. Code Ann. § 11-8-4.5-2 (Michie Supp. 1996), Iowa, see Iowa Code Ann. § 7.22
(West 1995), Kansas, see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3723 (1995), Kentucky, see Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 196.073 (Michie 1995), Louisiana, see La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
892.3 (West 1997), Maine, see Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34-A, § 3072 (West 1988),
Maryland, see Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 690B (Michie 1996), Massachusetts, see Mass.
Ann. Laws ch. 127, § 97B (Law. Co-op. 1989), Michigan, see Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 791.265 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997), Minnesota, see Minn. Stat. Ann. § 243.515 (West
1992), Missouri, see Mo. Ann. Stat. § 217.137 (West 1996), Montana, see Mont. Code
Ann. § 53-1-106 (1995), Nebraska, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-956 (1994), Nevada, see
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 209.291 (Michie 1996), New Hampshire, see N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 622-C:1 (Supp. 1996), New Jersey, see NJ. Stat. Ann. § 30:7D-1 (West 1997),
New Mexico, see N.M. Stat. Ann. § 314-31 (Michie 1996), New York, see N.Y. Cor-
rect. Law § 71 (McKinney Supp. 1997), North Dakota, see N.D. Cent. Code § 54-23.3-
04 (Supp. 1995), Ohio, see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5120.53 (Anderson 1996),
Oklahoma, see Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, § 96 (West 1991), Oregon, see Or. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 421.229 (Michie 1995), Rhode Island, see R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-40 (Supp.
1996), South Carolina, see S.C. Code Ann. § 24-1-145 (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp.
1996), South Dakota, see S.D. Codified Laws § 1-15-32 (Michie Supp. 1996), Texas,
see Tex. Crim. P. Code Ann. § 42.17 (West 1979), Utah, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-28b-
2 (1995), Virginia, see Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-220 (Michie 1994), and Washington, see
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 43.06.350 (West Supp. 1997). The American Correctional
Association and the International Affairs Committee have been helping states with-
out enabling legislation to develop enabling legislation. See Barnes, supra note 73, at
241 n.10.
141. The six states are Alabama, California, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, and Washing-
ton. See Ala. Code § 15-9-100; Cal. Gov't Code § 12012.1; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 944.596;
Iowa Code Ann. § 7.22; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 791.265; Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 43.06.350.
142. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 18-91a (stating that "the Commissioner of
Correction may, on behalf of the state and subject to the terms of the treaty, consent
to the transfer"). Furthermore, New York allows the commissioner to designate this
power to someone else. See N.Y. Correct. Law § 71(1-b) ("The commissioner, or his
designee, shall retain sole and absolute authority to approve or disapprove an in-
mate's application for transfer.").
143. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-9-100 ("The Governor may take any other action nec-
essary to initiate the participation of this state in the treaty.").
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utes. Alabama's enabling legislation is representative of approxi-
mately three-quarters of the U.S. state enabling legislation statutes:
When a treaty is in effect between the United States and a foreign
country that provides for the transfer of convicted offenders who
are citizens or nationals of the foreign country, the Governor of Al-
abama or the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, if
designated by the Governor, may consent to the transfer of the con-
victed offenders who are under the jurisdiction of the Department
of Corrections to the place or jurisdiction specified in the treaty.
The Governor may take any other action necessary to initiate the
participation of this state in the treaty.1 "
A few states-New York, California, and Ohio,-have chosen more
extensive language for their enabling legislation. 45 These more ex-
tensive statutes provide greater insight into the aims of the respective
state legislatures and the relationship of the state enabling legislation
to the transfer treaties. Accordingly, this Note analyzes the more de-
tailed enabling legislation of New York, California, and Ohio to ex-
amine aspects of international prisoner transfers at the U.S. state
level.
1. Enabling Legislation in New York
The State of New York recently amended section 71 of its correc-
tional law' 4 regarding the transfer of prisoners under a treaty.14 7 The
first section of the law addresses the prisoner's access to information
regarding international prisoner transfer treaties and the prisoner's
rights and options under the treaties."8 Section 71(1-a) requires that
prison law libraries have information "on international offender trans-
fers sufficient to inform those persons who are citizens of a treaty na-
tion of the existence of such treaties and of the means by which such
persons may initiate a request for return to the person's country of
citizenship.' 4 9 The law also requires that prison law libraries contain
annual Amnesty International Reports describing the conditions of
prisons in each treaty nation, and to the extent practicable, other re-
ports on prison conditions published by international organizations
such as the United Nations. 50 Furthermore, the law suggests that
prison law libraries list foreign countries' provisions for the reduction
of terms of confinement or a list of officials at the United States Jus-
tice Department or the embassies of foreign countries to whom the
144. Id.
145. See Cal. Penal Code § 2912 (West Supp. 1997); id. § 5028; Cal. Gov't Code
§ 12012.1; N.Y. Correct. Law § 71; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5120.53.
146. N.Y. Correct. Law § 71(1-a).
147. See Act of Aug. 2, 1995, ch. 547, 1995 N.Y. Laws 1514-15.
148. See N.Y. Correct. Law § 71(1-a).
149. Id.
150. Id
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inmate can write for information on these provisions. 151 Finally, the
law states that to the extent practicable, "newly received inmates who
are identified as foreign nationals of treaty nations shall.., be advised
of the existence of such treaties and the possibility of the initiation of
a transfer request."'
The second section of the amended law addresses the method by
which a transfer from New York would proceed under a treaty. 5 3
Section 71(1-b) affirmatively states that "[t]he commissioner [of the
department of correctional services] shall promulgate rules and regu-
lations setting forth the procedures by which an inmate may apply to
be considered for transfer to a foreign nation.' '5 Despite the clear
mandate of the language,155 the commissioner has not formally estab-
lished these rules and regulations. 56 Nevertheless, by mandating that
rules and regulations be promulgated, New York has shown its will-
ingness to establish clear guidelines for the process of transferring
prisoners under an international treaty.
New York's "rules and regulations" would presumably set forth in-
formation regarding the transfer of state prisoners under the transfer
treaties and the prisoners' rights and options under the New York en-
abling statute.157 The substantive character of these potential rules
and regulations makes them particularly significant. If promulgated,
such rules and regulations would entitle prisoners to the substantive
and procedural rights created by the legislation. 58 This explains why
prisoners in the federal system sought to force the Attorney General
to promulgate guidelines for considering the international transfer of
prisoners in the federal correctional system.' 59 The prisoners in the
federal system were unsuccessful because the enabling statute did not
151. See id.
152. Id Information regarding international transfers does not necessarily have to
come from the sentencing state. For example, Canada has prepared a booklet ex-
plaining the possibility of transfer for Canadians convicted in the United States.
Abbell & Ristau, supra note 99, at 129. "The Council of Europe has also prepared a
short, standard information form for prisoners eligible for transfer under the Conven-
tion on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons." Id.
153. See N.Y. Correct. Law § 71(1-b).
154. Id (emphasis added).
155. Id. There is no doubt that the statute requires the commissioner to promul-
gate these rules and regulations. Cf Bagguley v. Bush, 953 F.2d 660, 662 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (holding that "being 'authorized"' does not require the Attorney General to
promulgate rules); Scalise v. Thornburgh, 891 F.2d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 1989) (same).
For a discussion of this issue on the federal level, see supra part II.A.
156. Telephone Interview with Abraham Abramovsky, Professor, Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law (Mar. 1997).
157. See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
158. For example, if the department's rules required a hearing to decide upon a
transfer request, a prisoner whose request was denied without a hearing would be
entitled to judicial relief.
159. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 66
TRANSFER OF PENAL SANCTIONS
require that such guidelines be issued. 60 Because of the clear lan-
guage of the New York statute, however, a New York state prisoner
would not have to address the issue of whether the commissioner of
the department of correctional services has the discretion not to pro-
mulgate rules and regulations for considering a transfer request. New
York could have chosen not to mandate that formal rules and regula-
tions be promulgated, but it did not so choose.1 61
Even if New York's intent to establish clear guidelines for the trans-
fer of prisoners under a treaty did confer certain substantive and pro-
cedural rights on the prisoner, the prisoner would still not possess the
right to a transfer. The same statute which mandates that guidelines
be adopted also states that "[n]othing herein shall be construed to
confer upon an inmate a right to be a [sic] transferred to a foreign
nation."'1  In addition to the clarity of the language regarding a pris-
oner's right to transfer, New York further ensured that it was not lim-
iting the appropriate authority's decision making power. The statute
continues:
[t]he commissioner, or his designee, shall retain sole and absolute
authority to approve or disapprove an inmate's application for trans-
fer.... If a request for transfer is approved by the commissioner or
his designee, facility staff shall assist in the preparation and submis-
sion of all materials and forms necessary to effectuate the person's
request for transfer to the United States Department of Justice for
purposes of finalization of the transfer process .... 163
Thus, the commissioner has unchecked authority to decide upon re-
quests for the international transfer of prisoners, although he would
be subject to any rules and regulations which were formally adopted.
Despite New York's willingness to vest the commissioner of the de-
partment of correctional services with vast discretionary power, New
York's statute includes several procedural safeguards. For example,
the statute explicitly mandates that the state provide information re-
garding the existence of the treaties in prison law libraries and re-
quires the consent of the prisoner before his transfer.'6 The enabling
160. See Bagguley, 953 F.2d at 662 (holding that "being 'authorized'" does not re-
quire the Attorney General to promulgate rules); Scalise, 891 F.2d at 647 (same); see
also supra notes 99-115 and accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretation of
the federal enabling legislation regarding the discretion of the U.S. Attorney
General).
161. There are many options other than the mandatory language of the New York
statute or the federal enabling legislation which authorizes but does not require the
Attorney General to establish guidelines. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code Ann.§ 72.68.010(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1997) ("If directed by the governor, the secretary
shall, in carrying out this section ... adopt rules ... to effect the transfer of prisoners
requesting transfer to foreign countries.").
162. N.Y. Correct. Law § 71(1-b) (McKinney Supp. 1997) (footnote omitted).
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. I& § 71(1-a to 1-b). These provisions are also covered in part by the federal
enabling legislation and the international transfer treaties. See Inter-American Con-
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legislation in three other states also seeks to guard the rights of the
prisoner. 165 Consequently, the state cannot abridge a prisoner's rights
under the treaty by positing that it can operate outside the scope of
the treaty because it is not a party to the treaty.' 6
In the same amendment to section 71 of the correction law, New
York also amended section 5 of the correction law. 16 7 Section 5 cre-
ates the department of correctional services and the position of com-
missioner as the head of that department. 168 The amended section 5
now states that
[t]he commissioner [of the department of correctional services] is
hereby authorized and empowered to convert the sentence of a per-
son serving an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, except a
person serving a sentence with a maximum term of life imprison-
ment, to a determinate sentence of imprisonment equal to two-
thirds of the maximum or aggregate maximum term imposed where
such conversion is necessary to make such person eligible for trans-
fer either to federal custody or to foreign countries under treaties
... [for] the execution of penal sentences.169
The sponsor of the amendment was specifically addressing the prob-
lem of transferring to Canada the increasing number of Canadian citi-
zens sentenced to indeterminate sentences in New York State
prisons.17 0 The conversion of indeterminate sentences to determinate
sentences is not necessary to request or execute transfers under the
vention, supra note 3, arts. III, V, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-35, at 2, 3 (1996), Hein's No.
KAV 4762 (stating that "[t]he sentenced person must consent to the transfer, having
been previously informed of the legal consequences thereof' and that "the sentencing
state shall permit the receiving state to verify, if it wishes, through an official desig-
nated by the latter, that the sentenced person has given consent to the transfer in full
knowledge of the legal consequences thereof'); Convention with Europe, supra note
3, art. 3(1), 35 U.S.T. 2867, 2872, 22 I.L.M. 530, 531 ("A sentenced person may be
transferred under this Convention only on the following conditions: ... if the transfer
is consented to by the sentenced person. .. ."); United States-Mexico Treaty, supra
note 8, art. IV(2), 28 U.S.T. at 7403 (requiring the prisoner's consent before transfer);
18 U.S.C. § 4100(b) (1994) (stating that "[a]n offender may be transferred to or from
the United States only with the offender's consent" and providing for verification of
consent by a "verifying officer"); see also id. §§ 41074109 (discussing the procedure
for verifying consent and who qualifies as a "verifying officer").
165. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 18-91a (West 1992) (requiring the prisoner's con-
sent before a transfer); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 353-16.5(b) (1993) (requiring the prisoner's
consent if the receiving country is not, according to a list published by Amnesty Inter-
national, an approved country regarding the treatment of prisoners); Or. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 421.229 (Michie 1995) (requiring that the prisoner approve his transfer in
writing).
166. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
167. See Act of Aug. 2, 1995, ch. 547, 1995 N.Y. Laws 1514.
168. See N.Y. Correct. Law § 5 (McKinney 1987) (amended 1995).
169. Id. § 5(4) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
170. New York State, 1995 Legislative Annual 408-09 (1996) (Memorandum of As-
semblyman Daniel L. Feldman); New York State Assembly, Memorandum in Sup-
port, 1995 N.Y. Laws 2244.
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federal legislation 7' or under each of the transfer treaties. 172 Some
treaties, however, require determinate sentences.' 73 Thus, by enacting
this amendment, New York appears to have expanded the base of for-
eign prisoners that might be eligible for transfer under international
treaties.174 At the same time, however, New York has elected to re-
move certain prisoners, those serving sentences with a maximum term
of life imprisonment, from eligibility for transfer. 17- As a result, the
process for executing a transfer may have been made less cumber-
some as the law intended,176 but the absolute number of transfers may
not increase.
Before the amended version of sections 5 and 71 took effect on Au-
gust 2, 1995,1' the previous provisions of section 5 governed the
transfer of prisoners under international treaties.178 That law recog-
nized that it was "in the public interest" to utilize the transfer treaties
and that prisoners with indeterminate sentences of imprisonment in
New York were not eligible under some treaties unless their sentences
were made determinate.' 7 Thus, it seems that the previous New York
statute encouraged the department of correctional services to work
with the governor to carry out the purpose of the transfer treaties.
This previous New York statute provided that the department of
correctional services was "authorized and empowered to take such
steps as are necessary at the state level to implement the terms of
171. See 18 U.S.C. § 4102(2-3) (1994) (authorizing the Attorney General to transfer
or receive offenders sentenced to imprisonment, parole, or probation).
172. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, arts. I, II, S. Treaty Doe.
No. 104-35, at 1, 2 (1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762 (requiring only that the sentence be
final: a "judicial decision imposing ... imprisonment or a term of parole, probation,
or other form of supervision without imprisonment" and with no legal appeal pend-
ing); Convention with Europe, supra note 3, art. 3, 35 U.S.T. 2867, 2872, 22 I.LM.
530, 531 (stating that "at the time of receipt of the request for transfer, the sentenced
person [must] ha[ve] at least six months of the sentence to serve or ... the sentence
[must be] indeterminate").
173. See, e.g., United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 8, art. IV(6), 28 U.S.T. 7399,
7404 ("No offender shall be transferred unless either the sentence which he is serving
has a specified duration, or such a duration has subsequently been fixed by the appro-
priate administrative authorities.").
174. But see infra notes 176-83 and accompanying text. Connecticut, Ohio, and
Washington have also empowered state officials to fix determinate sentences to make
a prisoner eligible for transfer under a treaty. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 18-91a(b)
(West Supp. 1997) ("[Ifl a foreign national... is barred from transferring ... due to
the indeterminate nature of his sentence, the board of pardons may... set a deter-
mined date."); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5120.53(C) (Anderson 1996); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 43.06.350 (West Supp. 1997).
175. N.Y. Correct. Law § 5(4) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
176. New York State Assembly, Memorandum in Support, 1995 N.Y. Lavs 2244.
177. Act of Aug. 2, 1995, ch. 547, 1995 N.Y. Laws 1514.
178. Before the amendments to sections 5 and 71 became effective on August 2,
1995, section 71 of New York's Corrections Law did not address the transfer of pris-
oners under international treaties. See notes accompanying N.Y. Correct. LaV § 71
(McKinney Supp. 1997).
179. Act of Aug. 3, 1984, ch. 743, 1984 N.Y. Laws 2123 (amended 1995).
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[transfer] treaties between the United States of America and foreign
countries."'180 To further the implementation of transfer treaties, the
statute also provided that "the authority of the department of correc-
tional services shall include the power to recommend to the governor
the commutation of the sentence of a person serving an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment to a determinate sentence."'' The gover-
nor of the state was given the power to grant the recommendation and
commute the sentence "where such commutation is necessary to make
such person eligible for transfer under the terms of such treaties."'"
Thus, by preventing the governor from fixing the sentences of prison-
ers sentenced to life imprisonment, 83 New York's amended section 5
has actually decreased the number of New York state prisoners who
might be eligible for transfer under a treaty.
2. Enabling Legislation in California
California is the only state other than New York which has enabling
legislation that formally addresses the prisoner's ability to obtain in-
formation regarding his options and the possibility of transfer under
an international treaty.184 The California enabling statute requires
that the appropriate agency "devise a method of notifying each un-
documented felon in a prison or reception center.., that he or she
may be eligible to serve his or her term of imprisonment in his or her
country of origin" under federal treaties.'8 5 California does not ad-
dress the notification of those felons who are not "undocumented,"
however, and therefore does not provide this notification procedure
to all prisoners who may be eligible for transfer. 8 6 Furthermore, the
California statute uses the language "country of origin" to refer to the
receiving state under an international treaty, 8 7 but a prisoner's coun-
try of origin is not necessarily relevant to whether the prisoner is eligi-
ble to transfer to a state under a transfer treaty.las Rather, it is the
prisoner's current citizenship which is determinative. 89
While California did not adopt or require the adoption of specific
guidelines regarding transfer decisions, California has shown some in-
terest in promoting transfers."9 Specifically, California seeks to pro-
mote the transfer of undocumented felons by: requiring that this class
180. Ide
181. Id
182. Id
183. See supra notes 167-76 and accompanying text.
184. See Cal. Penal Code § 2912 (West Supp. 1997).
185. Id
186. See id Presumably, "undocumented" prisoners are those who have entered or
remained in the country illegally.
187. Id
188. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 8. For a discussion of why the citizenship requirement is mis-
guided, see Plachta, supra note 60, at 1045-49.
190. See Cal. Penal Code § 2912(b)(1); id. § 5028(c).
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of prisoners be notified of the possibility of transfer under a treaty,' 9'
encourgaging eligible prisoners to apply for transfer,'9 and authoriz-
ing a payment of not more than $2,000 per year to be made to a re-
ceiving state which accepts and imprisons a transferred prisoner."w
California also requires that the Board of Prison Terms "provide quar-
terly reports outlining its efforts" to encourage the transfer of
prisoners.194
3. Enabling Legislation in Ohio
In addition to New York, Ohio is the only other state which has
enacted enabling legislation to specifically address the discretion of
state officials to execute a transfer under a treaty.195 Most state en-
abling legislation, as well as the federal enabling legislation, does not
mention the factors that should be considered when making a transfer
decision.196 Presumably, this gives the decision maker, in most cases
the state governor,197 wide discretion over whether to grant or deny
the transfer request.
The State of Ohio, like New York, requires that rules be adopted
governing the decision to transfer a prisoner under a transfer treaty.198
Ohio goes further, however, by mandating that the rules adopted must
include the requirement that when considering a transfer, the director
of rehabilitation and correction or his designee consider: (1) the na-
ture of the prisoner's offense; (2) the likelihood that the prisoner
would serve a shorter sentence in the receiving state than he would in
Ohio; (3) the likelihood that the prisoner would return or attempt to
return to Ohio after being released from imprisonment in the receiv-
ing state; (4) the degree of shock to the conscience of society that
would be experienced in Ohio if the prisoner is transferred; and (5) all
other factors that are deemed relevant to the determination. 99 Some
of these considerations overlap with the informal guidelines on the
federal level adopted by the Office of Enforcement Operations in the
Justice Department.'20 No Ohio court has had occasion to review the
decision making process regarding transfer of a prisoner set out in the
statute. Even if the Ohio department of corrections failed to adopt
specific decision making guidelines, a prisoner in Ohio could at least
cite the statute as setting forth the minimum number of factors which
191. See id. § 2912(a).
192. See id. § 2912(b)(1).
193. See id. § 5028(c).
194. Id. § 2912(b)(1).
195. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5120.53(D) (Anderson 1996).
196. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text; supra part IILA.
197. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
198. See N.Y. Correct. Law § 71(1-b) (McKinney Supp. 1997); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 5120.53(D).
199. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5120.53(D)(1-5).
200. See supra note 99.
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must be considered in deciding upon the transfer. The Ohio enabling
legislation also excludes certain prisoners, based on the type of crime
committed, from any eligibility for transfer under a treaty,201 but does
provide for conversion of indeterminate sentences to determinate
sentences to execute a transfer. 2
III. OPERATION OF TRANSFER TREATIES UNDER U.S. STATES'
ENABLING LEGISLATION
This Note has analyzed the individual U.S. states' enabling legisla-
tion, which allows foreign nationals to transfer out of the United
States.20 3 This Note now turns to a critique of that enabling legislation
in light of the goals of the transfer treaties.?°  The basis for this cri-
tique is not altruism towards foreigners imprisoned in the United
States or anxiety over the international human rights of those prison-
ers, although raising those issues will be beneficial as well.205 Rather,
this critique is based on the principle that following the rules of the
transfer treaties and allowing foreign nationals to transfer out of
American prisons when appropriate are keys to the success of transfer
treaties.20 6 This is because abiding by the rules of the treaties provides
the basis for reciprocal behavior by other nations.2 7 Thus, the actions
of the sovereign U.S. states regarding the implementation of transfer
treaties have a significant effect upon the success of transfer treaties
for the entire nation.
201. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5120.53(B)(1).
202. Id. § 5120.53(C).
203. See supra part II.B.
204. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
205. For a discussion of how to ensure the proper administration of justice for those
charged or convicted of crimes in a foreign land, see Gisvold, supra note 60.
206. See Abramovsky, Endangered Species, supra note 2, at 453 (arguing that
resorting to unilateral abductions will undermine cooperation between nations and
the viability of transfer treaties); see, e.g., Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3, at 428-29
(stating that several American prisoners were transferred to the United States from
Mexico while a large numer of Mexican prisoners were transferred to Mexico in a
one-time mass transfer).
207. See Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3, at 425-26 (explaining that the European
nations party to the Convention with Europe contend that an individual nation should
not apply guidelines other than those in the Convention to the decision making pro-
cess). Alternatively, the United States could choose to reduce foreign assistance or
development loans for those countries which are unwilling to accept a designated per-
centage of prisoners approved for transfer by the Attorney General. See Transfer of
Alien Prisoners Act of 1997, S. 3, 105th Cong. § 107 (1997). This bill reflects a radical
departure from current use of transfer treaties. The bill also requires the Secretary of
State to renegotiate transfer treaties to make the consent of foreign prisoners in the
United States unnecessary to execute a transfer. See id. § 103. This would make trans-
fer under a treaty more analogous to a deportation.
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A. Compliance by Individual U.S. States with the Terms of
the Treaties
The enabling legislation in the individual U.S. states does not effec-
tively further compliance with the transfer treaties. Although it is
clear that the states are not parties to the treaties,' they should not
ignore provisions of the treaties, the federal enabling legislation, and
congressional intent. While many state statutes do not directly contra-
vene either the treaties or the enabling legislation, the statute- do not
clearly comply with the treaties or the federal enabling legisladon,
At the same time, U.S. states have encouraged the federal govern-
ment to increase the transfer of foreign prisoners 1 0
It is well established that treaties are the supreme law of the landP 1
Federal legislation written to execute treaties is deemed "necessary
and proper" to the execution of those treaties.1 2 Furthermore, trea-
ties and federal statutes preempt any inconsistent or conflicting state
law.21 3 It has also been said that "[s]tates must abide by federal for-
eign policy measures, even when they encroach on areas in which the
state would otherwise have concurrent authority to legislate. '2 14
Thus, to the extent a state statute thwarts transfer treaties' goals and
the treaties' implementation by federal legislation, that state law may
be unconstitutional. This principle also applies to states with statutes
which do not expressly contradict the treaties, but do so as applied.
Simply put, many of the U.S. states' enabling legislation does not
encourage or actively facilitate the transfer of prisoners under the
transfer treaties. State enabling legislation fails to provide for identifi-
cation and notification of eligible prisoners, to limit the discretionary
208. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
209. This is problematic because of the possible effects on foreign relations. One
commentator asserts that "the Framers were concerned about treaty violations [by
states] because they could provoke wars, deter other nations from entering into bene-
ficial agreements with us, and adversely affect the nation's reputation." Vdzquez,
supra note 134, at 1110.
210. See Bruce Zagaris, International Criminal and Enforcement Cooperation in the
Americas in the Wake of Integration: A Post-NAFTA Transition Period Analysis with
Special Attention to Investing in Mexico, 3 Sw. J. L & Trade 1, 21 (1996) (stating that
"political pressure exerted by the states on the federal government to take action to
return foreign prisoners more expeditiously because of the economic and other bur-
dens on state prison systems" contributed to an accelerated prisoner transfer program
with Mexico).
211. U.S. Const. art. VI; Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796); see also VAzquez, supra
note 134, at 1104-08 (1992) (explaining that there was consensus at the Constitutional
Convention that measures were needed to ensure compliance by the states with trea-
ties, with the Supremacy Clause as the ultimate solution).
212. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
213. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04
(1983); K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 381
A.2d 774, 778 (NJ. 1977) (citing Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 190 (1961)) ("A
state law must yield when it is inconsistent with or impairs the policy or provisions of
a treaty.").
214. Gisvold, supra note 60, at 786.
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authority of the state official who must consent to the transfer, and to
allow a prisoner's sentence to be made determinate and thereby to
allow that prisoner to become eligible for transfer under some
treaties.215
Only two states, New York and California, have provisions in their
enabling legislation that address a prisoner's access to information re-
garding a transfer treaty.216 The New York statute guarantees the
availability of certain information regarding the treaties and seeks to
identify and notify those prisoners who would be eligible for transfer
under a treaty.21 7 The California statute seeks to notify only "undocu-
mented felons" about the possibility of transfer under a treaty.218
"Undocumented felons" represent only a subset of those prisoners
who might be eligible for transfer, however.219 Because only two
states have statutes which address the identification and notification
of prisoners eligible for international transfer, it is safe to assume the
overwhelming majority of prisoners eligible for transfer are unaware
of the transfer option, or are aware of the option but do not know how
to initiate the transfer.
The failure to notify eligible prisoners of the possibility of transfer
contravenes the transfer treaties. The Convention with Europe pro-
vides that "[a]ny sentenced person to whom this Convention may ap-
ply shall be informed by the sentencing State of the substance of this
Convention."2" Again, while an individual American state may not
be bound by the language of the treaty,22' it is clear that the treaty's
goal is to ensure that eligible prisoners are aware of their transfer op-
tions. Similarly, the treaty with Mexico contemplates that an individ-
ual prisoner can initiate a transfer request.'m It is not realistic to
think that a prisoner can do this without some access to information
or notification of the possibility of transfer.2. 3 Furthermore, the legis-
215. See supra part II.B.
216. See supra notes 148-52, 184-89, and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
220. Convention with Europe, supra note 3, art. 4(1), 35 U.S.T. 2867, 2872, 22
I.L.M. 530, 531; see also Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, art. IV(1), S.
Treaty Doc. No. 104-35, at 2 (1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762 ("Each state party shall
inform any sentenced person covered by the provisions of this convention as to its
content.").
221. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
222. United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 8, art. IV(1), 28 U.S.T. 7399, 7403
("Nothing in this Treaty shall prevent an offender from submitting a request to the
Transferring State for consideration of his transfer.").
223. Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3, at 413-14 (stating that the lack of requests for
transfer from Mexican offenders in California state prisons "is blamed primarily on
the lack of information available and provided to offenders on their potential right to
transfer").
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lative history of the federal enabling legislation reveals Congress' in-
tention that the transfers be freely granted.224
The degree of discretion which state enabling legislation gives to
state officials in considering a transfer request is especially troubling.
Almost all state enabling legislation offers no guidance to the decision
maker who is, in most cases, the governor.225 Because no guidance is
provided, the governor could conceivably consult a number of sources
to inform his decision. For instance, he might attempt to comport his
decision with the purpose and mandate of the treaties. In the alterna-
tive, the governor could look to the Justice Department's informal
guidelines for considering a transfer request.2. Unfortunately, the
lack of guidance in the state enabling legislation also allows the gover-
nor to use his own criteria for assessing a transfer request. Only Ohio
has written specific guidelines for considering a transfer request into
its enabling legislation.227 New York has required that rules and regu-
lations regarding a transfer request be promulgated, but none have
been promulgated accordingly.228
The failure of state enabling legislation to address the discretion of
the decision maker considering a transfer request violates the spirit, if
not the letter, of the transfer treaties. It is well established that the
transfer treaties confer wide discretion on both the receiving and
transferring states.229 Nevertheless, the U.S. Attorney General is
bound by the language of the treaties in a way that the states are
not.230 The treaty with Mexico, for example, requires that certain fac-
tors enter the Attorney General's calculus.23 1 State decision makers
should use these same factors in considering a transfer request.
The state legislatures have conferred even greater discretion on
state decision makers by allowing parties other than the governor to
make the final transfer decisions. Only twenty four of the forty states
with enabling legislation require that the governor himself consider
and decide upon the transfer request.232 Six states allow the governor
or the governor's designee to make the decision, and three states em-
power solely the commissioner of the department of corrections to
make the decision. 33 One state, New York, empowers the commis-
sioner of the department of correctional services or his designee to
consider and consent to the transfer. 2z
224. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 99.
227. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 92-135 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
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The danger posed by this aspect of the U.S. state enabling legisla-
tion is that decisions directly affecting foreign policy have been re-
moved from the most accountable public official on the state level of
government. Not only does the American federal form of government
remove the consideration of transfer requests from the executive
branch of the federal government, but the state enabling legislation
also further distances the decision by relegating it to unelected and
possibly ill-informed officials.235 The commissioner of a state depart-
ment of corrections is not likely to be concerned with developing a
coherent foreign policy regarding the transfer of foreign prisoners.
Even if an individual state's commissioner is aware of the bigger pic-
ture, there is little one state decision maker can do to ensure a coher-
ent transfer policy.2 36 The United States' inability to ensure
compliance by the U.S. states with the terms of the transfer treaties
weakens the prospects for reciprocity and cooperation with other na-
tions.2 37 Disruptions in this area of foreign policy could, in turn, ad-
versely affect other aspects of foreign affairs.2 38
Finally, only four states-Connecticut, New York, Ohio, and Wash-
ington-have empowered state officials to fix determinate sentences
for foreign offenders with indeterminate sentences and thereby make
them eligible under the treaties which require determinate
sentences.2 39 Even in these four states, not all prisoners with indeter-
minate sentences are eligible to have their sentences fixed.2 40 Failure
of the states to provide for fixing determinate sentences does not con-
travene the transfer treaties; the treaties do not even require a party
to the treaties, such as, the United States, to do this. This decision by
U.S. states not to provide for the fixing of sentences, however, repre-
235. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
236. It is clear that transfer treaties are inherently part of the United States' larger
foreign policy. See, e.g., Transfer of Alien Prisoners Act of 1997, S. 3, 105th Cong.
§ 107 (1997) (linking foreign assistance and development loans to cooperation under
transfer treaties); Kevin Cullen, IRA Technician to Complete US Prison Term in Ire-
land, Boston Globe, Jan. 20, 1997, at A6 (linking the transfer of IRA members home
to Ireland to a larger role for the United States in resolving the conflict in Northern
Ireland).
237. The United States already creates the possibility that it will impede a transfer
on the federal level by allowing the Attorney General to use decision making guide-
lines not found in the transfer treaties, a practice not followed in the European coun-
tries. See Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3, at 425-26. A provision in the Inter-American
Convention might bypass this problem by allowing an individual state to transfer a
prisoner internationally without federal approval, although it is unclear whether the
provision would, in fact, have this effect. See Inter-American Convention, supra note
3, art. V(3), S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-35, at 3 (1996), Hein's No. KAV 4762; Walsh &
Zagaris, supra note 3, at 427. In any event, the United States has objected to this
provision. Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 3, at 427.
238. See supra part I.C; see also Transfer of Alien Prisoners Act of 1997, S. 3, 105th
Cong. § 107 (1997) (seeking to punish foreign countries for their failure to cooperate
and accept prisoners approved for transfer by the Attorney General).
239. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 66
TRANSFER OF PENAL SANCTIONS
sents another example of the states' failure to facilitate transfers,
which is the goal of the transfer treaties. 1
B. Judicial Deference
Despite the limited number of decisions in federal courts, it is clear
that transfer decisions made by the Attorney General will carry at
least the presumption that they are proper, and might even be deemed
beyond review 2 42 Because no state court has had occasion to inter-
pret its state's enabling legislation, it is not clear how closely state
courts will scrutinize transfer decisions or how much deference will be
given to the decision maker.
Federal courts' justifications for deferring to the Attorney General's
decision making may not be applicable in challenges to state enabling
legislation or the decisions of state actors. Because of marked differ-
ences between state and federal enabling legislation,243 transfer deci-
sions at the state level will not always be analogous to those at the
federal level. Accordingly, it may be necessary for state courts to
scrutinize enabling legislation and transfer decisions more closely than
the federal courts.
While the federal enabling legislation does not require the Attorney
General to promulgate guidelines for deciding transfers,2 " some state
enabling legislation mandates that such guidelines be established2 45
Other state enabling legislation makes it explicitly clear that transfers
are to be encouraged and participation under transfer treaties maxi-
mized.3 These significant differences between state and federal en-
abling legislation require that the state and federal enabling legislation
not be applied in the same way.2 47 Thus, state courts may be expected
to follow the plain meaning of the statutes and rule accordingly.
Similarly, federal courts' deferential reliance on the Attorney Gen-
eral's decisions regarding transfers24 may not translate into state
courts' reliance on state decision makers. Because many states' en-
abling legislation does not vest the authority to decide upon transfers
241. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
242. See supra part HA.
243. See e.g., supra notes 105, 154, and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 154-56, 198-99, and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text; see also Senate Institutions,
Health and Welfare Committee Statement to NJ. Stat. Ann. § 30:7D-1 (West 1997)("[W]hile a state relinquishes authority over the prisoners transferred, the state will
not have to accept new prisoners in return. The practice of prisoner transfers should
contribute to the easing of overcrowded conditions in the State prisons . . . ."); New
York State Assembly, Memorandum in Support, 1995 N.Y. Laws 2244 (stating that
two amendments to the laws of New York governing participation in international
transfer treaties "will result in a savings to the state due to the decreased demand for
bedspace").
247. See supra notes 99-115, 154-56, 198-99, and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
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in a specific office,249 the deference afforded to the Attorney General
would be inappropriate. Furthermore, state courts may realize that
international transfers of prisoners are not based on the same peno-
logical considerations as intrastate transfers.250 International transfer
of a prisoner does not require placement of the prisoner in another
state institution, and removal of the prisoner from the state and coun-
try would not negatively impact public safety in most cases. 5 In ad-
dition, the prisoner's request for transfer suggests prima facie that the
transfer is in the prisoner's best interest. Whereas intrastate transfers
may have local and institutional implications which are difficult to dis-
cern, international transfers would rarely present such issues.
C. The Traditional Justifications for Punishment and U.S. State
Participation in International Transfer Treaties
The shortcomings of state enabling legislation are obvious not only
from a legal perspective, but also from a policy perspective. The tradi-
tional justifications for the state's role in punishing those convicted of
a crime support more widespread use of the transfer treaties. The jus-
tifications for punishment can be furthered by increasing the use of
international transfer treaties in two ways: (1) U.S. states' recognizing
the value of international transfers and granting almost all transfer
requests, and (2) expanding the number of prisoners eligible for
transfer.
The traditional justifications for the state punishment of prisoners
are based on the concepts of deterrence, retribution, and restraint. 2
The deterrence of crime occurs when it is widely believed by individu-
als that punishment, in any of its forms, is undesirable. 53 For deter-
rence to be effective, the probability and undesirability of receiving
state-sponsored punishment must outweigh the expected benefits of
committing a given crime. The concept of retribution is based on the
need for the community to exact some punishment from the pris-
oner.2 54 Restraint, or utility, addresses the costs and benefits of re-
moving a prisoner from the ranks of the community: there are costs
involved with imprisoning an offender, but benefits gained from en-
suring the offender will not commit future crimes.z 5
As a traditional justification for punishment, deterrence is neutral
in relation to the transfer of prisoners under international transfer
treaties. The transfer treaties do not allow prisoners to escape from
249. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
251. An exception would exist, for example, where the prisoner was the leader of a
terrorist group and could more easily operate from a prison in his home country.
252. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 1.5(a), at 23-26
(2d ed. 1986).
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id.
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imprisonment if they are transferred out of the sentencing state.256
Although a receiving state must convert a prisoner's foreign sentence
to a sentence under the domestic laws of the receiving state, the re-
quirement of double criminality ensures that some compatibility exists
between the penal laws of the receiving and sentencing states.25 7
While a prisoner might benefit by being closer to friends and family if
his transfer request is granted, the prisoner might also suffer under
less sanitary or other unfavorable prison conditions in foreign coun-
tries. Thus, on the whole, the transfer of foreign prisoners neither fur-
thers nor hinders the operation of deterrence in fighting criminal
behavior.
Furthering the retributive aspects of punishment presents the
strongest argument against the use of transfer treaties. The policy of
retribution includes the idea that the state is punishing a prisoner on
behalf of the people. Transferring the prisoner elsewhere would re-
move the role of the sentencing state in administering the punishment,
and thus the sentencing state would find transfer unacceptable. This
argument makes good sense for denying the transfer of the occasional
prisoner who is convicted of heinous crimes against the people of a
state. Those kinds of prisoners, however, are few and far between.2 -58
Furthermore, even the slightest discretion given to a state decision
maker would allow the decision maker to deny that particular pris-
oner's request for transfer. In many cases, however, foreign prisoners
are convicted of crimes which do not call for the need of the sentenc-
ing state itself to administer punishment.
From a utilitarian perspective, the transfer of foreign prisoners
presents an ideal situation for the U.S. states. The transfer treaties are
a one way street out of U.S. state prisons: U.S. states can transfer
prisoners out of their correctional systems but do not receive prison-
ers who are transferred back to the United States. Thus, U.S. states
benefit from removing a prisoner from circulating in the community
and, if the prisoner is transferred abroad, the states do not have to pay
the cost of incarcerating the prisoner. Clearly, the utilitarian justifica-
tion for punishment would suggest that U.S. states use transfer trea-
ties to their fullest extent.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR U.S. STATE ENABLING LEGISLATION
The international transfer treaties seek to maximize the potential
rehabilitative aspects of punishment and, at the same time, shift the
burden of imprisoning offenders to the prisoner's homeland and fain-
256. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
258. See Plachta, supra note 60, at 1050 ("Although there are significant arguments
based on public interest in favour of prisoners serving sentences in their own coun-
tries, the public interest is not seriously damaged if an individual prisoner of overseas
origin serves his sentence in that country.").
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ily. This Note is highly critical of the shortcomings of current U.S.
state enabling legislation and the failure of U.S. state enabling legisla-
tion to take full advantage of the benefits of transfer treaties. This
part argues that there are several actions that states can take to im-
prove the operation of transfer treaties. Specifically, this part pro-
poses that U.S. state enabling legislation should: include provisions
for the mandatory identification and notification of prisoners eligible
for transfer, enact explicit guidelines regarding the discretion over
transfer decisions, vest decision making authority with high ranking
state officials, and allow for the conversion of indeterminate sentences
to determinate sentences. This part also argues that state courts
should scrutinize transfer decisions more carefully than the federal
courts.
This Note makes these proposals to achieve two objectives. The
first objective is to encourage those U.S. states without enabling legis-
lation to take notice of the legal and policy issues favoring the use of
the transfer treaties and to design enabling legislation accordingly.
The second objective is to encourage those U.S. states with enabling
legislation to consider the importance of amending their legislation to
include provisions more favorable for executing transfers.
Legislative provisions for the mandatory identification and notifica-
tion of prisoners who might be eligible for transfer should be included
in state enabling legislation. This would encourage wider use of the
transfer treaties. Furthermore, procedures for identification and noti-
fication, such as those found in the New York legislation,159 can be
instituted easily and inexpensively. All that is necessary is that prison
officials check a prisoner's citizenship against a list of countries with
whom there is a transfer treaty. The officials could then distribute a
pamphlet, similar to the information form used in Europe or the
booklet compiled by Canada,260 to the potentially eligible prisoners.
From both legal and policy standpoints, there is nothing to be gained
from allowing or ensuring a prisoner's ignorance of the transfer
treaties.26'
Most importantly, U.S. states should adopt explicit guidelines, simi-
lar to those in the Ohio statute, regarding the discretion of state deci-
sion makers.262 As noted earlier, the enabling legislation of Ohio
requires that the decision maker consider: (1) the nature of the pris-
oner's offense; (2) the likelihood that the prisoner would serve a
shorter sentence in the receiving state than he would in Ohio; (3) the
likelihood that the prisoner would return or attempt to return to Ohio
after being released from imprisonment in the receiving state; (4) the
degree of shock to the conscience of society that would be exper-
259. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 152.
261. See supra part III.C.
262. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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ienced in Ohio if the prisoner is transferred; and (5) all other factors
that are deemed relevant to the determination - 3a Guidelines do not
guarantee that transfer treaties will be utilized to their full potential,
but explicit guidelines have the advantage of providing a concrete
framework for the decision making process. Prisoners and their coun-
sel could rely on the guidelines and frame transfer requests accord-
ingly. Formally adopting guidelines would cause states to decide what
specific factors should be considered and prevent every transfer re-
quest from being decided on an ad hoc basis. Thus, rather than denot-
ing specific guidelines which should be used, this Note recommends
that any explicit guidelines which further the goals of the treaties
would be beneficial because such guidelines would bring stability and
clarity to an otherwise murky area of law. For example, Ohio's open-
ended guidelines reflect the understanding that international transfers
of prisoners are part of a broader foreign policy; the guidelines give
state actors sizeable discretion, but they also focus the attention of the
decision maker on specific factors. Furthermore, explicit guidelines,
enacted or specified in a statute, would give courts the ability to prop-
erly review transfer decisions.
Individual states should not thwart the intent of the transfer treaties
or Congress' understanding of how decisions regarding transfers
would be made under the treaties.261 Thus, it is necessary for U.S.
states to vest decision making power regarding international transfers
with higher, rather than lower, state authorities. Currently, many
states designate a decision maker and then allow that decision maker
to designate someone else.2 0 This practice does not ensure that the
proper factors will be consistently weighed when deciding upon an
international transfer. These decisions, which affect our nation's for-
eign policy and ability to comply with international legal obligations,
should be left to the state's governor or attorney general.
Courts on the state level should undertake a higher level of scrutiny
of transfer decisions than the scrutiny used by the federal judiciary.266
At the least, state courts should ensure that state officials are follow-
ing the requirements of the state enabling legislation. If states recog-
nize the importance of overall compliance with the transfer treaties
and pass legislation accordingly, the courts must be willing to ensure
that the state executive branches comply with the legislatures' intent.
Finally, state enabling legislation should also include provisions
which allow the governor or other state actor to convert a prisoner's
indeterminate sentence to a determinate sentence. Such a provision
would only make more prisoners eligible for transfer under certain
treaties. The provision would have no effect on the ultimate decision
263. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5120.53(D)(1-5) (Anderson 1996).
264. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
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of whether to grant the transfer. Because in most cases a transferred
prisoner must serve out his remaining sentence in his home country,
the duration of a sentence governs the degree of punishment. Inde-
terminate sentences do not ensure prisoners will serve longer jail time.
If longer sentences are the objective, indeterminate sentences can sim-
ply be converted to long determinate sentences.
International transfer treaties have the potential to play a more sig-
nificant role in improving the prospects for rehabilitation of offenders
and decreasing the cost of doing so. Individual U.S. states should ex-
amine their respective enabling legislation and improve the operation
of international transfer treaties over prisoners on the state level.
States can accomplish this by notifying eligible prisoners, enlarging
the pool of prisoners who may be eligible, and ensuring that state ac-
tors apply consistent standards in deciding upon transfer requests.
CONCLUSION
Transfer of penal sanctions treaties present a unique opportunity for
the United States to address the problem of Americans imprisoned
abroad as well as the cost of imprisoning foreigners at home. The
transfer treaties also signify the United States' willingness to cooper-
ate in furthering criminal justice in the international arena. Further-
more, transfer treaties recognize the individual rights of prisoners and
the factors which enhance their rehabilitation.
On the federal level, the U.S. Attorney General has been given
wide discretion to consider transfer requests, pursuant to the transfer
treaties and enabling legislation. The legality, and certainly the wis-
dom, of the courts' conferring this wide discretion to the Attorney
General is questionable. The transfer treaty with Mexico suggests that
the Attorney General must consider certain enumerated factors; the
House Report to the federal enabling legislation suggests a presump-
tion that a transfer request will be granted unless there are extraordi-
nary circumstances. Furthermore, Scalise v. Thornburgh,267 the
principal case on this issue, analogized international prisoner transfers
to intrastate prisoner transfers. This Note has shown, however, that
the international transfer of prisoners is part of a larger U.S. foreign
policy, which has more far-reaching concerns than the capacity, main-
tenance, or security of correctional facilities.
Despite judicially-granted wide discretion, the Attorney General
has utilized informal guidelines for considering requests and is bound
by all provisions regarding transfer decisions set forth in individual
treaties. Conversely, U.S. states have maintained an independence
from the provisions of transfer treaties. This allows for unlimited dis-
cretion in various state actors' deciding upon transfer requests. Fur-
thermore, U.S. states have not endeavored to inform foreign prisoners
267. 891 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1989).
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who might be eligible for transfer or to fix determinate sentences for
prisoners who could be made eligible for transfer.
The U.S. states' current enabling legislation reflects an unwilling-
ness to account for the broader aims and needs of U.S. foreign policy.
The U.S. state legislation presents obstacles to the success of transfer
treaties by decreasing the prospects for reciprocity and cooperation in
the international arena. Furthermore, the legislation cannot be justi-
fied under traditional justifications for the punishment of offenders.
Accordingly, U.S. states should adopt enabling legislation or amend
existing enabling legislation to further the specific goals of the transfer
treaties and the broader needs of American foreign policy.
Notes & Observations
